Transparency, Liberalization and Financial Crises by Gil Mehrez & Daniel Kaufmann








We investigate the effect of financial liberalization on the probability of a banking crises in
economies with poor transparency We construct a model with imperfect information where
banks cannot distinguish between aggregate shocks on the one hand, and government’s policy
and firms’ quality, on the other. Thus, a sequence of positive shocks or non-transparent policy
causes banks to increase their credit above the optimal level given the underlying value of the
firms. Once banks discover their large exposure, they are likely to roll-over bad loans rather
than declare their losses. This delays the crisis, but increasing its magnitude. Empirical
investigation using data on 56 countries from 1977 to 1997 supports the theoretical model.
We find that the probability of a crisis is higher in the period following financial
liberalization, significantly so in countries with poor transparency.
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1. Introduction
The importance of transparency of economic activity and policy has sprung to the for front of
economic research following the recent financial and banking crises in Mexico, South East
Asia and Russia. Evidence from other countries that have experienced long period of poor
transparency and low growth rate suggest that poor transparency may have adverse affect on
long term growth as well.
1
Most economic models emphasized the effect of transparency at the micro level on
firms’ behavior, and at the macro level on agents response to unobserved monetary or fiscal
policy. At the micro level for example, Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that managers will
borrow rather than issue equity when they have private information about the firm’s profit. At
the macro level, recent attentions have been paid to the relationship between international
common lenders behavior and poor transparency. For example, Calvo (1999), Calvo and
Mendoza (1999), and Kodres and Pritsker (1998) show that costly information about
international investments can produce herding and contagion effects. Zeira (1999) shows that
poor transparency may lead to “informational overshooting” in the stock market.
This paper analyses how poor transparency combined with new and deregulated
financial markets may lead to unsustainable investment, and large exposures and vulnerability
of financial institutions. The reason for this outcome is the process by which new financial
markets acquire information on borrowers. Initially, when financial markets are deregulated,
banks have very limited information on specific borrowers. In addition, even if banks have the
necessary information they might not have the skills to use it efficiently. Thus, banks lend
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small amounts to many borrowers (i.e., credit rationing occurs as in Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981)). As a result, investment is low and inefficient, projects with high productivity get the
same amount of credit as projects with low productivity. As time passes, information on
specific projects (borrowers) is revealed and banks update their credit accordingly. They
increase credit to projects with high productivity and decrease credit to projects with low
productivity. If the economy is transparent (i.e., there is no uncertainty regarding the true
outcome of the projects) the learning process is fast and efficient in the sense that the updated
belief are correct, and the banking system is solid. If, on the other hand, transparency is poor
in the sense that the priors are uncertain and the revealed information is very noisy, the
learning process may lead to inefficient and unsustainable allocation of credit. That is, even
though banks adjust their belief rationally, in the sense that they update their belief based on
their priors and the new information, a series of positive shocks or non transparent policy
would increase in banks’ exposure and vulnerability.
The analysis has several policy and empirical implications. The main policy
implications are as following. First, an increase in transparency such as increase in the
transparency of fiscal and monetary policies or of macro economic data, would decrease the
probability that financial liberalization would lead to a crisis. Second, policy makers should
be very alert about banks’ behavior during periods of high economic activity, especially if
they posses bad information not available to the public. Third, financial crises can occur
regardless of financial liberalization, but financial liberalization combined with poor
transparency increases the probability of a crisis. This does not imply that countries should
not liberalize their financial system or that financial liberalization always result in a crisis. It
implies only that countries that liberalize their financial sector should make every effort to3
increase transparency. Fourth, if financial institutions become vulnerable, it is very likely that
their condition will deteriorate rather than improve. In other words, financial institutions have
incentive to role over loans rather than declare their losses and adjust their loans. Thus,
delaying adjustments (e.g., bail out, closing down banks) may be costly in the sense that it is
likely to increase the magnitude of the crises.
In order to test whether indeed financial liberalization combined with poor transparency
increases the probability of a banking crisis – we construct a data set of 56 countries from
1977 to 1997. The empirical results suggest that financial liberalization increases the
probability of a crisis during the five years following a liberalization. We further find that the
probability of a crisis following a liberalization is higher in countries with poor transparency
than in countries that are transparent.
This paper is constructed as following. In the next section we present a dynamic model
of credit and investment and discuses the role of transparency. Section 3 discusses how
financial liberalization with poor transparency may lead to financial crisis and discusses some
policy implications. Section 4 presents empirical evidence in support of the model. Section 5
concludes.4
2. A Simple Model of Investment with Poor Transparency
Suppose an economy with many heterogeneous projects. Each project yields different
returns for the same level of investment. The return of each project increases with the level of
investment but at a decreasing rate, i.e., marginal productivity is positive and decreasing.
There is a free entry to each project and all investors in the same project receive the same
returns. That is, both the first investor and the n investor receive the average return.
Specifically, assume that there is a continuum of projects, distributed uniformly along the unit
interval. Let 
*
j R ,be the return of project j. 
*
j R , depends on three elements – a project specific
quality (productivity) 
*
j q , the level of investment in the project,  j I , and an aggregate shock,
V, that affects all projects in the economy.
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The discussion above describes investment opportunities in the economy, i.e., the
demand for credit. In the next section, we discuss the supply of funds to investors.
2.1 Financial Institutions
The supply of funds to projects is provided by financial institutions that operate in a
perfect competition environment taking the interest rate for deposits and the interest rate for
borrowers (investors) as given. Financial institutions are required by regulators to hold equity
proportional to their lending (deposits), e.g., reserve requirements.
We first describe the equilibrium in an economy with complete information and then
discuss the dynamics in an economy with incomplete information, i.e., poor transparency. In5
an economy with complete information, the profits of a financial institutions from lending an
amount I to firm j are
) (
s r r I - , (2)
where r is the interest rate which financial institutions charge borrowers, and 
s r is the interest
rate they pay to depositors (both are given to the banks). Let the equity (reserve) deposits ratio
be d . Thus, the required equity (reserve) is  I d , and the returns for financial intermediaries
from a loan of I are
d d
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In words, the returns from lending I are equal to the interest rate spread divided by the
required equity (reserves) ratio.
The level of investment in each project is determined by the project’s specific
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Thus, the level of investment in each project depends on the project specific productivity, 
*
j q ,
the state of the aggregate economy, V, and the interest rate, r. Assuming that the function R*
is invertible and separable, equation (4) can be solved to yield the level of investment in each
project as a function of the project specific productivity, the aggregate shock, and the interest
rate. 
2
) , , (
* r V g I j j q = . (5)
                                                   
2 Note that investment in some projects may be zero.6
Finally, aggregate investment can be derived simply by aggregating over all projects in the
economy,
  () ) ( ) , , (
1
0
* j d r V I I j j = q . (6)
One can use the model above to solve for the equilibrium interest rate in a general
equilibrium framework. Our focus, however, is to discuss the affect of poor transparency on
the dynamic of credit and the vulnerability of the financial sector. Thus, we assume that the
interest rate are given and investigate the effects of poor transparency on financial
institutions’ lending behavior.
2.2 The Role of Transparency in Banks’ Decision Making
Consider an economy where financial institutions have limited information about
specific projects, for example, an economy where the financial system has been liberalized or
deregulated. Assume that initially financial institutions cannot distinguish between projects.
Their only information is that projects’ quality (returns), 
*
j q , are drawn from a normal
distribution with unknown mean m and variance of 1.
) 1 , ( ~
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Even though m , the mean of the projects’ quality is unknown, financial institution have prior
belief that m  is drawn from a normal distribution with meana  and variance
2
a s .
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The initial priors are given exogeneously (the beliefs may be correct in the sense that  a m =
or may be incorrect) and are updated every period as new information becomes available.7
In addition, the aggregate shock or policy, V, is unobserved. It is known, however, that
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At the end of each period, the returns of all projects are observed. The returns, however,
are a combination of the project’s quality and the aggregate shock (or policy), V. Since V is
unobserved, it is impossible to learn the quality of each project with certainty. The new
information, however, can be used to update the priors.
2.3 Initial Period
In the initial period, given their information set, financial institutions can not distinguish
between projects. Thus, they treat every projects as if it is a random draw from a normal
distribution with mean a and variance of  ) 1 , , (
2 2 2
a V c s s s . Thus, they lend to all projects the
same amount where the exact amount depends on the required rate of return by financial
institutions, assume that financial institutions are risk neutral and require a return of 
F r . The
level of lending, therefore, is determined such that expected return from lending is equal to
F r , where
d
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The first term is the return when the loan is repaid, that is, the probability that projects’
returns are greater than r, times the interest rate. The second term is the returns from projects
with returns below r, that is the probability of given returns times the return integrated over all8
possible returns less than r. The third term is the interest rate paid to depositors. Equation (9)
can be solved to yield the level of investment as a function of r, 
F r ,
S r  and the prior belief.
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The allocation of credit is inefficient in a sense that all projects receive the same amount
of credit regardless of the productivity. Projects with low productivity receive too much credit
while projects with high productivity receive too little credit.
2.4 Proceeding periods
In the end of each period, the returns from each project are realized. That is, banks
observe  ) , , (
* V I R j j j q , but not 
*
j q or V. For simplicity, assume that  V j +
* q  are observed
but one can not distinguish between 
*
j q and V, i.e., one can not distinguish between the cases
where projects have high productivity and the economy had a bad shock ( a is high and V is
negative), and the case where projects have low productivity and the economy had a positive
shock ( a is low and V is positive).
The dynamics of investment (credit) depends on the updating of the information which
in turns depend on the priors and the realizations of V. The prior belief is that the mean
productivity of projects is
) , ( ~
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At the end of the period, the observed returns have a mean equal to  V + q  where  =
j
j q q .
Therefore, the new information is that
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V
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Thus, one can use bayesian inference to update the priors using the new information,


































If the priors are very uncertain, i.e., 
2
a s  is large, then the posterior belief depends mainly on
the new information. On the other hand, if the priors are certain, i.e.,  0
2 = a s , then the new
information allows us to distinguish between the firms, but the belief about the mean
productivity does not depend on the new information.
At the beginning of the next period credit is allocated according to the new priors. In the
end of the second period  V - = m q  is observed and the priors are updated. Specifically, the
priors are that
) , ( ~
2
N
N N s a m .
and the new information is that
) , ( ~
2
V
N N s q m .
Thus, the priors are updated using the bayesian rule above. The situation then repeats itself.
Given the new priors, lending decisions are made. At the end of the period,  V - = m q is
observed and the priors are updated accordingly.10
The dynamics of investment, assuming that the banks have to declare all their losses at
once, is determined by the zero profit condition. Credit to project j is such that the expected
return of the financial institution from investing in project j is equal to 
F r ,.
d
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Equation (14) yield the level of investment in each project as a function of r, 
F r ,
S r
j q - q ,
the priors and the history of aggregate shock,
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Finally, aggregate investment could be calculated simply by aggregating (15) over all
projects.
3. Exposures, Vulnerability and Transparency
In this section we discuss two issues. First, we describe how a country can become
exposed and vulnerable when financial institutions follow a rational policy as described
above. Second, we describe the conditions under which banks would choose to role over loans
to unprofitable projects, and hence delay the adjustment and increase the probability and
magnitude of a crisis.
Consider an economy with very uncertain priors that has experienced a success of
positive aggregate shocks (notice that these shocks do not necessarily have to increase over
time) or an unobserved expansionary policy. As a result, financial institutions have updated
their prior upward above the real productivity of each project. Note that it does not require the11
priors to be incorrect. It only requires some level of uncertainty. In economies with certain
priors, 0
2 È a s , the updating process is very slow and hence the financial system is very
unlikely to get exposed. On the other hand, in economies with uncertain priors, large
2
a s , the
adjustment is fast, and hence credit may increase fast and the financial system is more likely
to become vulnerable.
Consider now the banks’ response when it is realized that firms’ productivity is below
the expectation (suppose due to a negative realization of V). The response depends on the
extent of the losses, on future expectations, and on the financial regulations (e.g., the required
equity ratio or the ability to hide bad loans). Banks can either declare the losses and adjust the
lending according to the new information, or role the loans over and hide the losses. On the
one hand, if a bank declare its losses, it can adjust its lending according to the new
information. On the other hand, if the banks roles its loans over, it does not have to declare its
losses and hence decrease its equity, but it can not adjust its loans according to the new
information.
Specifically banks’ losses (profits) for a given realization, V, and for a given prior are
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The first term represents the returns over all projects. The returns are a function of the
realization, V, and the lending amount to each project. The second term is the interest paid to
depositors.
For simplicity suppose that banks can either declare all the losses, c, or role over all its
loans. Bank will choose to role over all the loans if12
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In words, if the bank declare its losses and adjust its loans, its new equity is  c I- d and the
expected return is  ) (c I r
F - d . On the other hand, if the banks role the loan over its returns are
given in the nominator. If the gains from rolling the loans over and “having” higher equity are
greater than the losses from not adjusting the credit, the bank will role the loans over. It is
very likely, however, given the updating process that banks overestimating the firms quality
and hence are very likely in a worse condition than they estimate. Hence, delaying the
adjustment is very likely will increase the banks losses and vulnerability.13
4. Empirical and Policy Implications
Policy Implications
The theoretical analysis has several policy and empirical implications. The main policy
implications are as following. First, an increase in transparency decreases the probability of a
crisis. Better transparency decreases the probability of banks confusing transitory shock or
policy with firms’ specific fundamentals and hence decreases the probability of a crisis.
Second, one should be very alert to the conditions of the banking sector following
liberalization and an expansionary period, especially if it (e.g., the government) possesses
information not available to the public. Third, if financial institutions become vulnerable, it is
very likely that the situation will deteriorate rather than improve. In other words, even if bank
equity is large enough such that there is no moral hazard problem, financial institutions may
still decide to role loans to bad projects. Moreover, banks may underestimate their
vulnerability. Thus, delaying the financial adjustment (e.g., declaring losses and adjusting the
loans) may be very costly in the sense that it will increase the probability and magnitude of a
crisis.
Empirical Implications
The analysis has several econometrics implications that we test in the following section.
The model implies that poor transparency by itself does not increase the probability of a
crisis. However, poor transparency, combined with noisy priors (such as in new deregulated
financial markets) increases the probability of a crisis. That is to say that the fact that some
countries with poor transparency have not experienced a crisis while other with better14
transparency have, does not imply that poor transparency has no effect on the probability of a
crisis. Our econometric investigation therefore has two parts. First, we test whether the
probability of a crisis increases after financial liberalization takes place. Second, we test
whether the probability of a crisis depends on the combination of financial liberalization and
poor transparency.
4.1. Data and Estimation
There are several empirical studies that estimate the causes of financial crises using
macro and financial variables. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998) investigate a data set of 20
countries between 1970 and mid 1995 and show that the increase in growth domestic credit
two years ago which they argue is a proxy for financial liberalization can help explain
banking crises. Caprio (1999) argue that “premature liberalization could be cited in virtually
all cases” of financial crises. Demirguc Kunt and Deteragiache (1998b) estimate the
probability of a banking crisis using a data set of 53 countries between 1980 and 1995. They
identify several macro, financial, and institutional variables that explain the probability of a
crisis. They argue that the banking crises are more likely to occur in liberalized financial
system. While these findings are consistent with our model, the model’s predictions are more
settled. The model’s two econometric predictions are as following. The first prediction is that
banking crises are more likely to occur only in the period following financial liberalization
and not in any liberalized financial system. The reason is that in established financial system
the priors are very certain and hence the adjustment is very slow while in recently liberalized
financial system the priors are very uncertain and hence the adjustment is very fast. The
second prediction is that the probability of a financial crisis is higher in the period following15
liberalization in countries with poor transparency. The reason is that poor transparency
increases the probability of confusing firms’ quality and aggregate or policy shock.
In order to test these predictions we constructed a data set of 56 countries between 1977
and 1997. In addition to financial liberalization and transparency variables, which we describe
below, the data set includes macro economic and financial variables that are identified by
Demirguc Kunt and Deteragiache as increasing the probability of a financial crisis. The
macroeconomic variables are: GDP growth rate, inflation rate, change in terms of trade, real
interest rate, and exchange rate depreciation rate. The financial variables are: M2 to gross
international reserve ratio, claims on private sector as percent of GDP, bank liquid reserves to
bank assets ratio and real credit growth two years ago. The source of the data is the
International Financial Statistics and the World Bank GDF & WDI.
Data on financial liberalization episodes are based mainly on Williamson and Mahar
(1998), Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal (1996), and Drees and Pazarbasioglu (1998). Williamson
and Mahar survey 51 financial liberalization episodes in 28 countries between 1977 and 1994,
Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal survey 6 financial liberalization episodes in 3 countries, and Drees
and Pazarbasioglu survey 4 financial liberalization episodes in 2 countries between 1986 and
1992. Data on banking crises are constructed based on the data and description in Lindgren,
Garcia, and Saal (1996) and Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998)
3. Since the crises may
affect the macroeconomic variables, we delete the five years following the crises. If the crisis
lasts longer than five years, we drop the observations while the crisis lasts.
4
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of macro/financial data. Therefore, there are 89 financial liberalization and 57 banking crises from 56 countries
in the final sample.
4 The results are robust to these specifications.16
Table 1 presents the countries in our sample, the periods and types of financial
liberalization, and the periods of banking crises. The financial liberalization varies in their
scope and magnitude. Some liberalization episodes were a move from very control financial
sector to a partial liberalized financial sector, while some were a shift from partial
liberalization to full liberalized financial sector. Some financial liberalization were taken at a
very slow rate while others were taken at very rapid rate. Due to the data limitations we do not
distinguish between the degree of liberalization, and consider all liberalization episodes the
same.
5
Table 2 presents some descriptive statistics about liberalization and banking crises.
There are 92 episodes of liberalization in our sample and 60 episodes banking crises. 36 out of
the 60 (60 percent) crises were preceded by a liberalization in the previous 5 years. 15 crises
occurred before liberalization and 9 occurred more than 5 years after stabilization. Out of the
92 episodes of financial liberalization, 40 (44 percent) were followed by banking crisis in the
next 5 years. Figure 1 presents the distribution of the duration between a crisis and a
liberalization for those crisis that were preceded by liberalization. Out of 36 crises that
occurred in the 5 years following a liberalization, 13 occurred 2 years after liberalization, 9
crises occurred 3 years after liberalization, and 5 crises occurred 4 years after stabilization.
4.2. Estimation results
Our first goal is to show that banking crises are more likely to occur only in the period
following liberalization. In other words, financial liberalization increases the probability of a
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liberalization and a move from partial liberalization to full liberalization17
crisis only in the initial periods of adjustment. In order to show that our model can improve
existing relevant literatures and as a robustness check, we first present the results based on the
same countries and definition of financial liberalization and crises as Demirguc-Kunt and
Detragiache (1998b). The only additional variable is a dummy variable that takes the value of
1 if financial liberalization had occurred in the previous 5 years and 0 otherwise. To ease
interpretations, we report the effects of one-unit changes in the dependent variables on the
probability of a crisis (expressed in percentage points) evaluated at the mean value of the data.
We also report the associated z-statistics that test the null hypothesis of no effect.
The first column in table 3 presents results of a probit model where the dependent
variable takes the value of 1 during years with a financial crises and 0 otherwise (excluding 5
years after the crises starts or while the crises last). The macroeconomic variables have the
expected signs and are significant except for the growth rate of terms of trade and the claims
of the private sector as a share of GDP. In this specification, the probability of a crisis
increases both in the 5 years following a liberalization and in a liberalized financial systems.
These results, however, are very sensitive to the sample and the definition of financial
liberalization. In the second column we report the results excluding Turkey
6. The results now
are very different. The probability of a crisis is higher only during the 5 years following a
liberalization and there is no evidence that the probability of a crisis is higher in liberalized
financial system.
The evidence is even stronger once we use date of financial liberalization based on
Williamson and Mahar (1998) and Drees and Pazarbasioglu (1998) surveys (see table 1).
Column 3 reports the results (including Turkey) using the adjusted dates of financial
                                                   
6 One reason to exclude turkey is that Turkey had additional banking crises during 1980-95, but these crises were
not included in their panel because of missing data.18
liberalization. The coefficients of the financial liberalization dummy variable is insignificant
(and negative) while the coefficients of the dummy variable for the 5 years period following a
financial liberalization variable is significant and positive. Thus, there is a strong evidence
that countries that liberalized in the last 5 years have higher probability of a crisis. There is no
evidence that liberalized financial system increases the probability of a crisis.
Finally, in the fourth column we present the results using our complete data set.
 7 The
probability of a banking crisis in countries that have had financial liberalization in the past 5
years is higher by almost 9% in this specification.
To conclude, the results provide strong evidence to the model’s prediction that the
probability of a crisis is higher following a financial liberalization. There is little evidence that
banking crisis is more likely to occur in liberalized financial system after controlling for the
liberalization period.
4.3. Transparency
In this section we turn to test whether the increase in the probability of a crisis depends
on transparency as the model predicts. That is, do countries that liberalize their financial
sector are more likely to have a banking crisis if transparency is poor?. One difficulty in
carrying out this test is that we do not have good data about transparency. Thus, we use two
measures to construct a proxy for transparency. First, we use an index of corruption. The
source of the corruption index is Political Risk Services, Syracuse, New York (ICRG indices).
The index ranges from 0 to 6, where highly corrupted countries take a value 6 while non-
corrupted countries take a value of 0. Using this index we create a transparency dummy
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variable that takes the value of 1 if the corruption index is greater than or equal to 3, (which is
about the median), and a value of 0 if the index takes a value less than 3.
8
Second we use a combination of the size of the public sector and corruption to create a
variable of transparency. Kopits and Craig (1998) argue that the transparency in government
behavior is reflected mainly in the structure and functions of the public sector, such as
financing operations. Thus, we create a measure of transparency by combining the ratio of
credits directed to the government and the public sectors to total domestic credits, and
corruption.
9 We define country with large (small) public sector if the share is greater (smaller)
than the median. We combined this measure with our measure of corruption and create three
transparency dummies: a dummy for poor transparency that takes the value of 1 if a country is
corrupt and has large public sector and 0 other wise. A dummy for medium transparency that
takes the value of 1 if a country is corrupt and has small public sector or is not corrupt but has
large public sector and 0 other wise. A dummy for good transparency that takes the value of 1
if a country is not corrupt and has a small public sector and 0 other wise.
One caveat of using corruption as a proxy for transparency is that corruption by itself
may affect the probability of a crisis. Financial liberalization may offer new opportunities for
corruption which may lead to financial crisis. Further more corruption and transparency are
very likely to be determined simultaneously. We leave this issue, however, for future
research.
Table 4 presents the effect of transparency on the probability of a financial crisis. In the
first column we test whether poor transparency increases the probability of a crisis. Thus, we
                                                   
8 The results are robust to the exact definition.
9 The data is taken from IFS. The ratio is (line 32an + 32b + 32bx + 32c) /  line 32.20
add transparency, using the first proxy as an explanatory variable, to the probit model above.
There is no evidence that poor transparency increases the probability of a crisis.
Next we turn to test whether poor transparency increases the probability of a crisis in
the period following financial liberalization as the model predicts. We interact the
transparency dummy variable with the dummy variable of financial liberalization in the
previous 5 years. That is, we create two dummy variables: One dummy takes value of one if
there was a financial liberalization in the previous 5 years and transparency is poor, and zero
otherwise. The other dummy takes value of one if there was a financial liberalization in the
previous 5 years and transparency is good, and zero otherwise. The results are presented in the
second column in table 4. Financial liberalization increases the probability of a crisis in both
cases. However, The probability of a crisis in countries with poor transparency that undertake
financial liberalization is higher by 10 percent compare to countries with good transparency
(21.89 compare to 11.55). Furthermore, the coefficients of the two dummies are significantly
different at 14%. This result suggests that poor transparency increases the probability of a
financial crises following financial liberalization.
The results using our second definition of transparency are presented in the third
column. The results are consistent with the findings above. The increase in the probability of a
crisis following financial liberalization decreases with the level of transparency (17.37, 12.73
and 6.66 for poor, medium and high transparency respectively).
Finally, as a robustness test we present the results using lag values of the macro and
financial variables. One could argue that this is a better specification since banking crises
affects the macro and financial variables at the same period. Since our focus here is the effects
of liberalization and transparency and not the effects of macro and financial variables we21
present the result only as a robustness test to the effects of liberalization and transparency on
the probability of a crisis. The results are presented in the last column. The effects of financial
liberalization are robust to lagged specifications. However, the macro and financial variables
are not robust to lagged specification.
5. Conclusions
The main conclusion of the analyses is that the probability of a financial crisis is higher
during the period of transition when the prior information set is uncertain. One such case of
transition is when countries undertake financial liberalization. We show that the probability of
a banking crisis is higher in the 5 years following the financial liberalization. Furthermore, we
show that the increase in the probability of a crisis is much higher in countries with poor
transparency.
It is important, however, to note that this does not mean that countries should not
liberalize their financial sector. Rather, the lesson is that countries should be more transparent,
especially during a period of transition. In this sense, it is better to liberalize the financial
system slowly in countries with poor transparency in order to slow down the speed of
adjustment.22
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Table 1: Financial Liberalization and Banking Crises
COUNTRY  FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION 1973-1998 CRISES
USA Abolition of capital controls in 1973*.
Deregulation of interest rates and credit controls from






Liberalized foreign exchange purchases from 1973*.
Reserve assets ratio abolished in 1981* and banks were
allowed to compete with building societies for housing





Belgium Financial markets partly liberalized by 1977*. Capital
controls were eased in 1986* with the adoption of the
EEC Program.
No major crisis
Denmark Restrictions on purchase of foreign securities and on
direct investments were eased in 1983*. In 1985*
further liberalization measures were adopted.
1987-1991
France Interest rates (except those on subsidized loans) freed
in 1984*.
Universal banks permitted in 1985*. Financial
institutions became less specialized by mid-1980s and
capital controls started to be lifted. Several French
banks were privatized in 1987 and Banque de France





Germany Capital controls dismantled, foreign banks permitted
and interest rates were freely market-determined from




Italy Credit ceilings eliminated in 1983* (although re-
imposed temporarily between 1986 and 1987). Reserve
requirements were lowered between 1988* and 1994.
Foreign banks were permitted in 1993 as well as some
privatization of state-owned banks.
1990-1994
58 banks were in
difficulties
Netherlands The financial sector was partly liberalized by 1977*. In
1983* all restrictions on capital controls were lifted. In
1986 all restrictions on capital outflows were
abolished.
No major crisis
Norway Interest rate controls were removed in 1985*. In 1987
supplementary reserve requirements were removed.




Sweden Ceilings on interest rates for private sector bonds were
lifted in 1980*. Also, foreigners were allowed to hold
Swedish shares in the same year. In 1985 ceilings on
bank loan rates were abolished. Foreign exchange
controls were lifted in 1989*.
1990-1993
18% of total bank
loans were reported
lost
Switzerland The financial sector was largely liberalized by 1977*. No major crisis24
Canada Financial sector was largely liberalized during the
period examined. In 1980* foreign banks were
permitted, although with some regulations. Reserve
requirements were eliminated in the early 1990s.
1983-1985




Japan Controls on capital inflows and interest rate regulations
were eased from 1979*. Controls on capital outflows
eased in the 1986*. The requirements of bank
specialization were reduced by 1993. Further
liberalization to be implemented by 2001.
1991-1997
Finland Regulations on bank lending rate were abolished in
1986*. In 1986 exchange control regulations were
lifted on long-term foreign borrowing. Cross border




Greece The process of liberalization of capital movements
started in 1987* with the adoption of the EEC Program.
Abolition of exchange rate controls in 1994*.
1991-1995
Ireland Restrictions on acquirement of foreign securities were
eased in 1979*. Restrictions on long-terms capital
outflows were eased in 1988*. Regulations on
exchange control were lifted in 1993.
1985
Austria Interest rate liberalized in 1980*
Portugal Controls on purchases of foreign securities were
relaxed in 1989*. In 1992* regulations on exchange
control were lifted.
1986-1989
Turkey Interest rate ceilings on loans and deposits eliminated
in 1980*. Direct credit was phased out in 1988. Capital







Australia Deposit rate controls lifted in 1980*. Capital account
liberalized in 1984. Most loan-rate ceilings abolished in







Foreign exchange controls removed in 1984*. Interest
rates controls eliminated in 1985* as well as
requirements for financial institutions to purchase
government securities. Stock exchange was liberalized
in1986.
1987-1990
South Africa Interest rate controls and credit ceilings were removed
in 1980*. Restrictions on bank competition were
eliminated and new banks were allowed in 1984*.
1977
1985
Argentina Credit controls were initially removed in 1977* but re-
imposed in 1981. The initial liberalization of 1977 was




Credit controls were substantially reduced in 1993*. 1989-1990
bank failure
accounted for 40% of
financial system
assets
Brazil Interest rate ceilings removed in 1976 and re-imposed
in 1979. Deposit rates were fully liberalized in 1989*.
Entry barriers reduced after 1991. Controls on capital
inflows were strengthened while controls on outflows
were loosened in the 1990s.
1994-1997
29 banks subjected to
intervention
Chile Commercial bank interest rates were liberalized in
1974. New foreign banks admitted in 1977*.Capital
controls were gradually eased since 1979. Controls
were re-imposed in 1982 and eased again in 1985*.
1981-1983
bank failures
Colombia Deposit rates were market-determined in 1980*. The
remaining controls on interest rates were lifted by
1994*. The large capital inflows in the early 1990s led
to the re-imposition of reserve requirements on foreign





Ecuador Interest rate liberalized in 1986*. 1995
Guatemala
Guyana Interest rate liberalized in 1991*. 1993-1995
Honduras Interest rate liberalized in 1990*.
Jamaica Interest rate liberalized in 1991*. 1994-1995.
Mexico Deposit and loan rates liberalized in 1989*.
Government gave discretion over foreign direct
investment  in 1972. Portfolio flows were decontrolled
even further in 1989. National banks were privatize in






Paraguay Capital controls were removed in 1988*. Foreign




Peru Capital controls and interest rate controls were
removed in 1991*. Subsidized lending was eliminated
in 1992*
No major crisis
El Salvador Interest rate liberalized in 1991*. 1989
Uruguay Interest rate liberalized in 1980*. 1981-1985
Venezuela Reserve requirements were reduced in the early 1990s.
Interest rate controls and foreign exchange controls
were liberalized in 1991*.
1994
Insolvent banks
accounted for 30% of
financial system
deposits
Israel Restrictions on investment were eased in 1987* and
restrictions on capital flows started to be eased.




out in 1991*. Directed-credit system was abolished in
1990.
Jordan Interest rate liberalized in 1988*. 1989-1990
Egypt Interest rates and foreign exchange controls were lifted
in 1991*.Ceilings on credit to private sector were lifted
too. Foreign banks were permitted to conduct business




Sri Lanka The exchange rate was unified in 1978. Capital
controls on inflows of capital were eased in 1978*.
Foreign banks were permitted since 1979.Restrictions




India Partially liberalized in 1992*. 1991-1995
Indonesia Most deposit and loan rates were freed in 1983.* The
monopoly of state-owned banks over the deposits of
state-owned enterprises were removed in 1989*. New
foreign banks were allowed to establish joint ventures
in 1988.
1992-1998
Korea Controls on outward and inward foreign investment
were gradually eased since 1983*.
1985-1986
Malaysia Interest rates and capital accounts were liberalized  by
1978.*Controls on interest rates were then re-imposed
in 1985 and completely eliminated in 1992*.
1985-1988
Nepal Interest rates were liberalized by 1989*. 1988-1994
Papua New
Guinea
Interest rate liberalized in 1980* 1989-1995
Philippines Interest rates controls mostly phased out over 1981*-
85. Direct credit partly abolished in 1983. Restrictions
on all current and capital transactions eliminated over




1.6% of the banking
system failed in 1981
Singapore Financial sectors largely liberalized by 1977*.
Exchange and capital controls were freed in 1978*.
1982
Thailand Restrictions on inwards long-term investments were
eased in 1985*. Direct credit was gradually eliminated
after 1980. Foreign banks were permitted in 1990.
Ceilings on loan rates were removed in 1992*.
1983-1987
15% of bank assets
were non-performing




Nigeria Interest rate liberalized in 1990*. 1991-1995
Tanzania Controls on interest rates were eased in 1986*.





Togo Interest rate liberalized in 1993*. 1993-1995
Uganda Interest rate liberalized in 1991*. 1994
Zaire Interest rate liberalized in 1980*. 1991-1995
Zambia Limits on remittances of profits and dividends were
eased in 1990*. Exchange controls were abolished and
interest rates were liberalized in December 1993*.
1995
* presents the year of financial liberalization in our data set.
Sources on financial liberalization:
- Pill, H., Pradhan, M. “Financial Indicators and Financial Change in Africa and Asia”. IMF
Working Paper No. 95/123. Washington D.C.: November 1995. (for Kenya, Tanzania and
Zambia).
- Demirguc, Asli and Enrica Detraagiache, “Financial Liberalization and Financial Fragility.”
IMF working paper ; WP/98/83, June 1998 (for Austria, Ecuador, Guyana, Honduras,
Jamaica, El Salvador, Uruguay, Jordan, Papua New Guinea, Nigeria, Togo, Uganda, and
Zaire)
- Drees, B., Pazarbasioglu, C. “The Nordic Banking crises. Pitfalls in Financial
Liberalization?”. IMF Occasional Paper No. 161. Washington D.C.: April 1998 (for Sweden,
Norway and Finland).
- Bakker, A. 1996. “The Liberalization of Capital Movements in Europe”. The Netherlands:
Kluwer Academic Publishers (for Belgium, The Netherlands, Greece, Ireland and Portugal).
- Lindgren, C., Garcia, G., Saal, M. 1996. “Bank Soundness and Macroeconomic Policy”.
IMF. Washington D.C. (for Paraguay)
- Williamson, J., Mahar, M. 1998. “A Survey on Financial Liberalization”. Essays in
International Finance No. 211. International Finance Section (for Argentina, Australia, Brazil,
Canada, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, France, Germany, Great Britain, India, Indonesia, Israel,
Italy, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Peru, The Philippines, Singapore,
South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey, USA, and Venezuela).
Sources on Banking Crisis:
- Caprio, G., Klingebiel, D. 1996. “Bank Insolvencies. Cross country Experience” Policy
Research Working Paper No. 1620. World Bank. (for Australia, New Zealand, Chile,
Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela, Egypt, Sri Lanka, Singapore, Kenya, Zambia).
- Demirguc, Asli and Enrica Detraagiache, “Financial Liberalization and Financial Fragility.”
IMF working paper ; WP/98/83, June 1998 (for Austria, Thailand, Togo, and Uganda)
- Drees, B., Pazarbasioglu, C. 1998. “the Nordic Banking Crisis: Pitfalls in Financial
Liberalization?”. IMF Occasional Paper No. 161. (for Norway, Sweden, Finland).
- Lindgren, C., Garcia, G., Saal, M. 1996. “Bank Soundness and Macroeconomic Policy”.
IMF. Washington D.C. (for Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Japan,
Korea, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Nepal, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Papua New Guinea,28
Paraguay, Peru, The Philippines, El Salvador, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania,
Turkey, Uruguay, USA, Venezuela, and Zaire).
Table 2: Banking Crises and Financial Liberalization
Total Number of Banking Crisis 60
Prior to the financial liberalization 15
Five years after liberalization 36
More than five years after liberalization 9
Total Number of Liberalization 92
Number of liberalization which did not have a crisis in the next 5 years 52
Number of liberalization which had a crisis in the next 5 years 40
Figure 1: Duration Between Liberalization and a Crisis
(in countries which had banking crisis following liberalization)29
Table 3: Probit Estimates: Financial Liberalization
Dependent Variable: Banking crisis
Excluding
Turkey
Explanatory dF/dX dF/dX dF/dX dF/dX
Variables (z-statistics) (z-statistics) (z-statistics) (z-statistics)
GDP growth -0.54*** -0.48*** -0.41*** -0.40***
(-4.21) (-3.83) (-4.10) (-4.07)
Terms of Trade Growth -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
(0.44) (-0.41) (-0.49) (-0.42)
Real Interest Rate 0.03** 0.04** 0.04*** -0.01
(2.30) (2.27) (2.61) (-0.29)
Inflation Rate 0.04** 0.03 0.03** 0.00
(2.38) (1.18) (2.02) (-0.24)
M2/Foreign Exchange Reserves 0.09 0.08 0.08* 0.06
(1.45) (1.41) (1.73) (1.30)
Private Credit as % of GDP 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
(0.88) (0.95) (0.59) (0.47)
Bank Cash and Reserves/Assets -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01
(-1.10) (-0.82) (-1.08) (-0.58)
2 Period Lagged Credit Growth 0.07** 0.08*** 0.06** 0.045*
(2.44) (2.61) (2.33) (1.85)



























(-2.39) (-2.18) (-1.90) (-1.90)
Financial Liberalization 2.37 1.29 -0.58
(1.59) (0.83) (-0.38)
Financial Liberalization in the past 2.43 3.65*
1
5 years with D & D dates
2 (1.46) (1.89)
Financial Liberalization in the past 9.31*** 8.60***
5 years with our dates (3.20) (5.06)
Number of Observations 632 624 632 728
Log likelihood -87 -82 -81 -89
***Significant at 1%
**Significant at 5 %
* Significant at 10%
1 Significant at 6 %
2 The financial liberalization dates are taken from Dermirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998a.31
Table 4: Probit Estimates: Financial Liberalization and Transparency




Explanatory dF/dX dF/dX dF/dX dF/dX
Variables (z-statistics) (z-statistics) (z-statistics) (z-statistics)
GDP growth -1.09*** -1.03*** -1.00*** 0.03
(-4.55) (-4.55) (-4.09) (1.12)
Terms of Trade Growth 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.07
(0.19) (0.11) (0.32) (0.58)
Real Interest Rate 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.78) (0.76) (1.05) (-0.10)
Inflation Rate 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
(-0.49) (-0.38) (-0.55) (0.21)
M2/Foreign Exchange Reserves 0.18 0.18 0.13 0.19
(1.61) (1.58) (1.03) (1.26)
Private Credit as % of GDP 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.03
(1.50) (1.35) (1.31) (0.60)
Bank Cash and Reserves/Assets 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.06
(0.74) (0.58) (0.48) (0.73)
2 Period Lagged Credit Growth 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.01
(-0.23) (-0.27) (-0.12) (0.57)
GDP per Capita -0.00* -0.00* -0.00* 0.00
(-1.88) (-1.90) (-1.91) (-1.48)
Transparency 0.99
(0.42)




Poor Transparency * Fin Liberalization
in the previous 5 years
21.89***
(5.29)
Transparency * Fin Liberalization in
the previous 5 years
11.55***
(3.52)
High Transparency 6.66** 6.90*
(1.86) (1.77)
Medium Transparency- 12.73*** 10.43**
(3.04) (2.47)
Poor Transparency 17.37** 13.84*
(1.94) (1.70)
Number of Observations 665 677 677 644
Log Likelihood -151 -154 -165 -174
***Significant at 1%
**Significant at 5 %
* Significant at 10%